SS Edmund Fitzgerald is a Great Lakes American shipload immersed in a Lake Superior storm on November 10, 1975, with the loss of an entire crew of 29. When it was launched on June 7, 1958, he was the largest ship on the Great Lakes of North America, and he remains the largest there.
For 17 years, Fitzgerald brought taconite iron ore from a mine near Duluth, Minnesota, to iron work in Detroit, Toledo, and other Great Lakes ports. As a hard worker, he makes seasonal catch records six times, often breaking previous records. Captain Peter Pulcer is known for piping day or night music on the ship's intercom as it passes the St. Clair and Detroit (between Lake Huron and Erie), and entertained the audience at Soo Locks (between Lakes Superior and Huron) with a running commentary about the ship. The size, the record-breaking performance, and the "DJ captain" are cherished by Fitzgerald for boat watchers.
Carrying a cargo full of ore pellets with Captain Ernest M. McSorley as commander, he embarked on his ill-fated journey from Superior, Wisconsin, near Duluth, on the afternoon of 9 November 1975. On his way to a steel plant near Detroit, Fitzgerald joined with the second freighter, SSÃ, Arthur M. Anderson . The next day, the two ships were caught in a severe storm on Lake Superior, with stormy winds and close waves up to 35 feet (11 m) tall. Shortly after 7:10 pm, Fitzgerald suddenly sank in Canada (Ontario) waters 530 feet (160 m) deep, about 17 miles (15 nautical miles, 27 kilometers) from Whitefish Bay near town twins Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, and Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario - Fitzgerald's distance can reach more than an hour at top speed. Although Fitzgerald has reported previous difficulties, no distress signals were sent before he drowned; Captain McSorley's last message to Anderson said, "We're holding our belongings." The crew killed 29, and no bodies were found. The exact cause of the sinking is still unknown, although many books, studies, and expeditions have examined it. Fitzgerald may have been flooded, structural failure or topside damage, destroyed, or suffered from this combination.
Disaster is one of the most famous in Great Lakes shipping history. Gordon Lightfoot made him the subject of his 1976 hit song "The Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald" after reading the article, "The Cruelest Month", in the November 24, 1975 issue of Newsweek The drowning led to changes in Great Lakes shipping rules and practices that included mandatory safety clothing, depth seekers, positioning systems, increased freeboard and more frequent ship inspections.
Video SS Edmund Fitzgerald
History
Design and construction
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, invests heavily in large scale iron and mineral industries, including the development of Fitzgerald , representing the first investment by American life insurance companies. In 1957, they contracted Great Lakes Engineering Works (GLEW), River Rouge, Michigan, to design and build vessels "with the maximum length allowed to pass the soon to complete Saint Lawrence Seaway." The value of the ship at that time was $ 7 million (equivalent to $ 46.9 million in 2016). Fitzgerald is the first laker built for the maximum size of St. Lawrence Seaway, which has a length of 730 feet (222.5 m), width of 75 feet (22.9 m), and with 25 feet (7.6 feet) m) concept. The printed depth (roughly speaking, the vertical height of the stomach) is 39 ft (12 m). The depth of the hold (the inner height of the cargo hold) is 33 ft 4 in (10.16 m). GLEW laid the first bell on August 7th of the same year.
With a deadweight capacity of 26,000 tonnes long (29,120 short tons, 26,417 t), and 729 ft (222 m) hull, Fitzgerald is the longest ship on the Great Lakes, earning him the Queen of the Lakes title until September 17 1959, when the SS 730-foot (222.5 m) Murray Bay was launched. Fitzgerald ' three central cargo loads were loaded through 21 watertight hatches, 11 to 48 feet (3.4 by 14.6 m) respectively from 5 / 16 -inch-thick (7.9 mm) steel. Initially coal was fired, the kettle was converted into fuel oil during the winter of 1971-72. In 1969, the ship's maneuverability was enhanced by the installation of a diesel-powered bow thruster.
With the standard carrier of the ore carrier, Fitzgerald's interior is luxurious. Design J.L. Its designed Hudson Company includes thick carpets, tiled bathrooms, curtains above the peephole, and leather swivel chairs in the living room. There are two state guest rooms for passengers. The air conditioning is extended to the crew, which features more facilities than usual. A large kitchen and fully stocked pantry provide meals for two dining rooms. Fitzgerald pilothouse is equipped with "sophisticated marine equipment and beautiful map space."
Name and launch
Northwestern named the ship after president and chairman of his board, Edmund Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald's grandfather himself was the captain of the lake, and his father owned the Milwaukee Drydock Company that built and repaired the ship. More than 15,000 people attended Baptism and the launch of the Fitzgerald 'ceremony on June 7, 1958. But the event was troubled by misfortune: When Elizabeth Fitzgerald, Edmund Fitzgerald's wife, tried to baptize the ship by smashing a bottle of champagne over the bow, it took three attempts to solve it. A 36-minute delay followed when the shipyard crew struggled to release the block paid off. After the launch to the side, the ship creates a big wave that "watered" the audience and then crashed into the dock before fixing itself. A man who watched the launch had a heart attack and then died. Another witness later said they swore that the ship was "trying to rise out of the water". On September 22, 1958, Fitzgerald completed nine days of sea trials. Career
The normal practice of Northwestern is to buy a vessel to be operated by another company. In the case of Fitzgerald ', they signed a 25 year contract with Oglebay Norton Corporation to operate the ship. Oglebay Norton immediately assigned the flagship Fitzgerald of his Columbia Transportation fleet.
Fitzgerald is a record-breaking workhorse, often defeating his or her own achievements. The record of a single ship's voyage was 27,402 tonnes long (30,690 ton short; 27,842 t) in 1969. For 17 years, Fitzgerald brought taconite from the Minnesota Range Iron Range near Duluth, Minnesota, to ironing work in Detroit, Toledo, and other ports. He makes seasonal catch records six different times. His nicknames include "Fitz", "Pride of the American Side", "Mighty Fitz", "Toledo Express", "Big Fitz", and "
Until a few weeks before his loss, the passengers traveled as company guests. Frederick Stonehouse writes:
Stewards treats the guests for the entire VIP routine. The cuisine is reportedly excellent and snacks are always available in the lounge. Small but well stocked kitchen provided drinks. After each trip, the captain held a candlelit dinner for the guests, complete with messy chauffeured servants and a special "clamdigger" blow.
Because of her size, her appearance, a series of notes, and "DJ captain," Fitzgerald became a favorite of boat observers throughout her career. Although Captain Peter Pulcer was in command of Fitzgerald on the way when the cargo record was set, "he was best remembered... to listen to music day and night on the ship's intercom system" as he passed St. John's. Clair and Detroit Rivers. While navigating Soo Locks, he often exits the pilot room and uses loudspeakers to entertain tourists with comments on details about Fitzgerald.
In 1969, Fitzgerald received a safety award for eight years of unharmed operation of a time-off worker. The ship ran aground in 1969, and he collided with SS Hochelaga in 1970. Later that same year, he hit a key wall, an accident repeated in 1973 and 1974. During 1974, he lost him. genuine bow anchor on the Detroit River. None of these accidents, however, are considered serious or unusual. Freshwater ships were built to last more than half a century, and Fitzgerald should still have a long career ahead of him when he sank.
The final crash and crash
Fitzgerald left Superior, Wisconsin, at 2:15 pm. on the afternoon of November 9, 1975, under the command of Captain Ernest M. McSorley. He was on his way to a steel factory on Zug Island, near Detroit, Michigan, with a 26,116 ton long (29,250 tonnes short) taconite ore 26,225 tonnets and soon reaching his full speed of 16.3 miles per hour (14.2 Kn; 26 , 2 km/h). At about 5 pm, Fitzgerald joined the second freighter under the command of Captain Jesse B. "Bernie" Cooper, Arthur M. Anderson, who was destined for Gary, Indiana, of Two Harbors, Minnesota. Unusual weather forecasts for November and the National Weather Service (NWS) predicted that the storm would pass in southern Lake Superior at 7 am on November 10.
SS Wilfred Sykes was posted opposite Fitzgerald at Burlington Northern Dock # 1 and departed at 4:15 pm, about two hours after Fitzgerald. In contrast to the NWS forecast, Captain Dudley J. Paquette of Sykes predicted that a massive storm would pass right through Lake Superior. From the beginning, he chose a route that utilizes the protection offered by the north shore of the lake to avoid the worst effects of the storm. The Sykes crew followed a radio conversation between Fitzgerald and Anderson during the first part of their journey and heard their captain decide to take the usual Lake Downbound Router Association of Operators.
NWS changed its forecast at 7:00 pm, issued a warning for the entire Lake Superior. Anderson and Fitzgerald are turning northward for cover along the coast of Ontario where they face a winter storm at 1:00 am on November 10th. Fitzgerald reported winds of 52 knots (96 km/h, 60 mph) and 10 foot (3.0 m) high waves. Captain Paquette of Sykes reported that after 1 AM, he heard McSorley say that he had reduced the speed of the ship due to harsh conditions. Paquette said he was stunned to then hear McSorley, who was unknown for sidelining or slowing down, stating that "we'll try for some lee from Isle Royale.You walk away from us anyway... I can live with you."
At 2:00 pm on November 10th, the NWS increased its warning from storm to storm, forecasting a 35-50 knot (65-93 km/h, 40-58 mph) winds. Until then, Fitzgerald has followed Anderson, traveling at a constant of 14.6 miles per hour (12.7 kn; 23.5 km/h), but increasingly quickly Fitzgerald pulled forward around 3:00 pm. As the center of the storm passes through the ships, they experience a wind shift, with wind speeds decreasing as the direction of the wind changes from northeast to south and then to the northwest. After 1:50 pm, when Anderson caught 50 knots (93 km/h, 58 mph), the wind speeds back up quickly and the snow began to fall at 2:45, reducing visibility; Anderson lost sight of Fitzgerald , which was about 16 miles (26 km) ahead of the time.
Shortly after 3:30 pm, Captain McSorley contacted Anderson to report that Fitzgerald was taking water and had lost two ventilation covers and fences. The ship also compiled the list. Two of the Fitzgerald ' six gastric pumps kept running to dispose of the water sent. McSorley said that he would slow his ship so that Anderson could close the gap between them. In broadcast shortly afterwards, the US Coast Guard (USCG) warned all shipments that Soo Locks had closed and they had to find a safe berth. Shortly after 4:10 pm, McSorley called Anderson again to report a radar failure and asked Anderson to track them down. Fitzgerald was effectively blind, slowed to let Anderson come within 10 miles (16 km) so that he could receive radar guides from other ships.
In the meantime, Anderson directed Fitzgerald towards the relative safety of Whitefish Bay; then at 4:39 pm, McSorley contacted the USCG station in Grand Marais, Michigan, to ask whether Whitefish Point lights and the navigation beacons were in operation. The USCG responded that their monitoring equipment showed that both instruments were inactive. McSorley then summoned every ship in the White Spot area to report on the state of the navigation aids, receiving answers from Captain Cedric Woodard from Avafors between 5:00 and 5:30 pm. that the Whitefish Point light is on but not the radio beacon. Woodard testified to the Marine Board that he heard McSorley say, "Do not let nobody on the deck," nor something about the vent that Woodard can not understand. Sometime later, McSorley told Woodard, "I have a bad list, 'I've lost both radar, and I took the heavy ocean on the deck in one of the worst seas I've ever experienced."
By the afternoon of November 10, a continuous wind of more than 50 knots (93 km/h, 58 mph) was recorded by ship and observation point east of Lake Superior. Anderson retained winds as high as 58 knots (107 km/h, 67 mph) at 4:52 pm, while the waves increased to 25 feet (7.6 m) at 6:00 am. Anderson is also exposed to 70-to-75-knots (130-139 km/h; 81-86 mph) gusts and rogue waves as high as 35 feet (11 m).
The last communication from the ship came around 7: 10 pm, when Anderson told Fitzgerald about a ship upstairs and asked how it was. McSorley reports, "We're holding our belongings." He sank a few minutes later. No distress signal was received, and ten minutes later, Anderson lost the ability to raise Fitzgerald over the radio or to detect her on the radar.
Search
Captain Cooper of Anderson was first called the USCG in Sault Ste. Marie at 7:39 pm on channel 16, the frequency of radio distress. The USCG respondent instructed him to call back on channel 12 because they wanted to keep their emergency channel open and they had difficulty with their communication system, including a storm detonated antenna. Cooper then contacts the saltwater vessel over Nanfri and is told that he can not take Fitzgerald on his radar as well. Despite repeated attempts to raise USCG, Cooper did not succeed until 7:54 am. when the officer on duty asked him to keep an eye on the 16 foot (4.9 m) boat missing in the area. At about 8:25 pm, Cooper again summoned the USCG to express his concerns about Fitzgerald and at 9:03 pm. reported he was missing. Petty Officer Philip Branch later testified, "I take it seriously, but at that time it is not urgent."
The lack of a proper search and rescue boat to respond to the Fitzgerald disaster, at about 9am, asked the USCG Anderson to turn around and look for survivors. Around 10:30, USCG asks all commercial vessels anchored at or near Whitefish Bay to assist with the search. The initial search for survivors was done by Anderson, and the second freighter, SS William Clay Ford . Attempts from the third freighter, the SS registered in Toronto Hilda Marjanne , were thwarted by the weather. USCG sent a float tender, Woodrush , from Duluth, Minnesota, but it will take two and a half hours to launch and one day to travel to the search area. The Traverse City, Michigan, USCG station launched the HU-16 fixed-wing search plane arriving on the scene at 10:55 am while the HH-52 USCG helicopter with a 3.8 million-candlepower highlight arrived at 1:00 am on November 11. The Canadian Coast Guard plane joins a three-day search and Ontario Provincial Police established and patrolled the coast along the east coast of Lake Superior.
Although searches found debris, including lifeboats and rafts, no crew was found. On its final voyage, the 29-man crew of 29 captains, first, second and third colleagues, five engineers, three oilers, a cook, swabs, two maintenance workers, three guards, three decks, three wheelers, two freighter, a cadet and an administrator. Most of the crew are from Ohio and Wisconsin; Their ages ranged from 20-year-old Karl A. Peckol to Captain McSorley, 63 years old and planning his retirement.
Fitzgerald is one of the largest and most famous ships lost on the Great Lakes but he is not alone at the base of Lake Superior in the area. In the years between 1816, when Invincible was lost, and in 1975, when Fitzgerald was drowned, the Whitefish Point area had claimed at least 240 vessels.
Maps SS Edmund Fitzgerald
Destroy invention and survey
Destroying discovery
US Navy Lockheed P-3 Orion, piloted by Lt. George Conner and equipped to detect the magnetic anomaly normally associated with the submarine, discovered the wreck on November 14, 1975. Fitzgerald lies about 15 miles (13 kilometers). nmi; 24Ã, km) west of Deadman's Cove, Ontario, 17 miles (15Ã, nmi; 27Ã, km) from the entrance to Whitefish Bay in the southeast, in Canadian waters close to the international border at a depth of 530 feet (160 m). A further 14-16 November survey by USCG using sonar scanning sides revealed two large objects lying adjacent at the bottom of the lake. The US Navy also contracted Seaward, Inc., to conduct a second survey between November 22 and 25.
Underwater survey
From May 20 to 28, 1976, the US Navy dipped shipwreck using an unmanned submarine, CURV-III, and found Fitzgerald lying in two large pieces in 530 feet (160 m) of water. The Navy's estimate places the length of the bow section at 276 feet (84 m) and the stern section at 253 feet (77 m). The bow section stands firmly in the mud, about 170 feet (52 m) from the stern which is located upside down at an angle of 50 degrees from the bow. Between the two damaged parts there are a large number of taconite and junk pellets scattered around, including hatch covers and ship hulls.
In 1980, during a diving expedition on Lake Superior, the sea explorer Jean-Michel Cousteau, son of Jacques Cousteau, sent two divers from RVÃ, Calypso in the first manned submersible dive to Fitzgerald. The dives were short, and although the dive team did not draw the final conclusions, they speculated that Fitzgerald had broken off the surface.
The Michigan Sea Grants Program arranged for three days of dive to research Fitzgerald in 1989. Its main purpose was to record 3-D video recordings for use in museum education programs and documentary film production. The expedition used a coupled survey system (TSS Mk1) and self-propelled, tethered, swim-free remote-operated water vehicle (ROV). Rover Mini Rover is equipped with mini stereoscopic camera and wide-angle lens to produce 3-D images. The survey system was withdrawn and Rover Mini ROV was designed, built and operated by Chris Nicholson of Deep Sea Systems International, Inc. Participants include the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National Geographic Society, the United States Army Technician Corps, the Great Lake Shipwreck Historical Society (GLSHS), and the US Fish and Wildlife Service, the latter providing RRL Grayling > as a support ship for ROV. GLSHS uses a portion of the five hours of video footage produced during the dive in the documentary and the National Geographic Society uses segments in the broadcast. Frederick Stonehouse, who wrote one of the first books on the Fitzgerald accident, moderated the 1990 panel review of a video that did not draw conclusions about the causes of Fitzgerald 'Drowning .
Canadian explorer Joseph B. MacInnis organized and directed six publicly funded dives into Fitzgerald during a three-day period in 1994. The Branch Oboranographic Institution provides Edwin A. Link as a ship support , and their manned submarine, Celia. GLSHS pays $ 10,000 for its three members to each join the dive and take a still image. MacInnis concluded that the records and videos obtained during the dives did not explain why Fitzgerald was drowning. That same year, the old sports divers Fred Shannon formed Deepquest Ltd., and organized private-funded dives to the Fitzgerald wreck, using the Delta Oceanography submarine Delta. Deepquest Ltd. performed seven dives and took over 42 hours of underwater video while Shannon set the record for the longest submersible dive to Fitzgerald in 211 minutes. Before dive, Shannon studied NOAA's navigation charts and found that the international boundary had been changed three times before the publication by NOAA in 1976. Shannon decided that based on the GPS coordinates of the 1994 Deepquest expedition, "at least one-third of two acres of direct junk containing two main parts the ship was in US waters due to errors in the US-Canada border position shown on the official lake map. "
Shannon's group found the remains of crew members who were partially dressed in clothes and wearing life jackets lying facing the bottom of the lake beside the bow of the ship, indicating that at least one of the crew was aware of the possibility of sinking the ship. The life jacket has deteriorated the canvas and "what counts as six square cork blocks... clearly visible." Shannon concluded that "major and advanced structural failures" caused Fitzgerald to split on the surface and drown.
MacInnis led another dive series in 1995 to save the bell from Fitzgerald. The Sault tribe of the Chippewa Indians supported the expedition by signing a $ 250,000 loan. Canada's atmospheric dive lawsuit Phil Nuytten, known as "Newtsuit", is used to take bells off ships, replace them with replicas, and put beer cans in Fitzgerald ' This couple is the only person known to have touched the Fitzgerald accident. They also made notes for the deepest dives on the Great Lakes and deepest dive ships, and the first diver to reach Fitzgerald without the aid of a submarine. It took six minutes to reach the wreck, six minutes to survey, and three hours to reappear to avoid decompression sickness, also known as the "bend." Limitations on survey
Under the Heritage Ontario Act, activities on registered archaeological sites require a license. In March 2005, the White Shark Point Preservation Agency accused the Historic Society of the Great Lakes Shipwreck (GLSHS) of unlawful dives to Fitzgerald. Although the GLSHS director admitted performing a sonar scan of an accident in 2002, he denied such surveys required a license at the time it was made.
The amendment of April 2005 The Ontario Heritage Law allows the Ontario government to enforce licensing terms about dives, submersible operations, side scanner sonar or underwater cameras within a certain radius around protected sites. Performing any activity without a license will result in a fine of up to CAD $ 1 million. Under amended legislation, to protect the crash site considered "watery graveyard", the Ontario government issued an updated regulation in January 2006, including an area with a radius of 500 meters (1,640 ft) around Fitzgerald and other specially designated marine archaeological sites. In 2009, further amendments to Ontario's Inheritance Law impose licensing requirements on all types of survey instruments.
Theories about the cause of the sinking
Extreme weather and ocean conditions play a role in all the published theories about the sinking of Fitzgerald ', but they differ on other causal factors.
Wave and weather theory
In 2005 NOAA and NWS conducted computer simulations, including weather and wave conditions, covering the period from 9 November 1975, until the morning of November 11th. The simulation analysis shows that two separate areas of high winds appear above Lake Superior. at 4:00 pm on November 10th. One has a speed of more than 43 knots (80 km/h, 49 mph) and other winds over 40 knots (74 km/h; 46 mph). The southeast part of the lake, the direction where Fitzgerald is headed, has the highest winds. The average wave height rises to close to 19 feet (5.8 m) at 7:00 pm, 10 November, and winds exceed 50 mph (43 kn, 80 km/h) in most of southeast Lake Superior.
Fitzgerald sank on the eastern edge of a strong wind region where the old take, or the distance of the wind blowing over the water, produced a significant average wave over 23 feet (7.0 m) at 7 pm. and more than 25 feet (7.6 m) at 8:00 am. The simulations also show one of 100 waves reaching 36 feet (11 m) and one in every 1,000 reaching 46 feet (14 m). Since the ship was heading east-southeast, the waves might have caused Fitzgerald to roll heavily.
At the time of drowning, the ship Arthur M. Anderson reported northwest winds of 57 mph (50 kn; 92 km/h), matching simulation analysis results of 54 mph (47 kn; 87 km/h). Further analysis showed that maximum sustained winds reached near a storm force of approximately 70 mph (61 kn; 110 km/h) with gusts up to 86 miles per hour (75 kn; 138 km/h) at the time and location where Fitzgerald sink.
Wicked wave theory
A group of three wicked waves, often called "three sisters," were reported around Fitzgerald when he drowned. The phenomenon of "three brothers" supposedly occurs in Lake Superior as a result of a series of three waves that make up a third larger than normal waves. When the first wave hit the deck of the ship, before the water drained the second wave. The third wave that enters adds two backwash accumulations, suddenly overloading the deck with plenty of water.
Captain Cooper of Anderson reported that his ship was "hit by two 30 to 35 feet of sea at around 6:30 pm, one buried the rear cabin and damaged the boat by pushing it right up to the saddle, a second wave of this magnitude, perhaps 35 feet up to the bridge deck. "Cooper goes on to say that these two waves, possibly followed by the three waves, continue towards Fitzgerald and will attack about the time he sank. This theory postulates that "three sisters" complicate the twin problems of the Fitzgerald ' and its lower velocities in the heavy seas that have allowed water to stay on the deck for longer than usual.
The Edmund Fitzgerald episode of the 2010 television series Dive Detectives shows the wave power tank from the National Research Council's Institute for Naval Technology at St. John's, and a tank simulation of the effects of a 17 meter (56 ft) spacecraft on the Fitzgerald scale model. Simulations show that rogue waves can almost soak bow or stern vessels with water, at least temporarily.
Flooding the charge theory
The July 26, 1977, USCG Sea Victim Report suggested that the accident was caused by ineffective hatch closure. The report concluded that the device failed to prevent waves from flooding the cargo space. Floods occur gradually and may not be felt during the last day, eventually resulting in a loss of buoyancy and fatal stability. As a result, Fitzgerald falls to the bottom without warning. Video footage from the shipwreck site shows that most of the hold clamps are in perfect condition. The USCG Marine Board concluded that some of the damaged clamps may be the only ones that are bound. As a result, ineffective hatch closing causes Fitzgerald to overwhelm and founder.
From the beginning of the USCG investigation, several families of crew and labor organizations believe that USCG findings can be tarnished because of serious questions about their readiness and licensing and regulatory changes. Paul Trimble, a retired USCG vice president and president of the Lake Carriers Association (LCA), wrote a letter to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on September 16, 1977, which included the following statement of objections to USCG findings:
The hatch cover present is a sophisticated design and is considered by the entire lakeside industry to be the most significant improvement over the telescoping leaf cover previously used for years... The one-piece hold blanket has proven to be absolutely satisfying in all weather conditions. without losing one ship in nearly 40 years of use... and no water accumulation in cargo space...
It is common practice for ore carriers, even in bad weather, to start with not all of the cargo clamps locked in the hold hatch. Marine writer Wolff reports that depending on weather conditions, all clamps are finally arranged in one to two days. Captain Paquette of Wilfred Sykes rejected the suggestion that unlocking the clamps caused Fitzgerald to be founder. He said that he usually sailed in fine weather using the minimum number of clamps needed to secure the hold hatch.
The 4th of May 1978, NTSB findings are different from USCG. NTSB made the following observations based on the CURV-III survey:
Hatch cover No. 1 is entirely in the hold # 1. 1 and shows buck indication of external loading. The coaming parts in the way of hatching No. 1 has been cracked and bent inward. No. hatcher cover 2 none and coaming on hatching No. 2 has been cracked and bent. Hatches No. 3 and 4 are covered with mud; one of the corners of the hatch cover. 3 can be seen on the spot. Hatch Cover No. 5 missing. A series of 16 consecutive closing cover clamps were observed in coaming hatching No. 5. From this series, the first and eighth are distorted or damaged. All 14 other clamps are not broken and in open positions. The 6 no open hatch and hatch cover stands at the vertical end of the hold. Hatch cover is missing from hatches 7 and 8 and both coatings are cracked and highly distorted. The arc part suddenly ends only extending the hatch No. 8 and the tear deck coating from separation to front end of hold. 7.
The NTSB undertook a computer study, testing and analysis to determine the forces needed to cover the hatch cover and concluded that the Fitzgerald sunk suddenly from a flood of cargo space "due to the collapse of one or more of the hatches covered below heavy giant sea rise "instead of flooding gradually due to ineffective hatching. Different opinions NTSB states that Fitzgerald sinks suddenly and unexpectedly from shoaling.
Shoaling Theory
LCA believes that instead of closing the manhole cover, a more probable cause of Fitzgerald's loss is shoaling or grounding at Six Fathom Shoal to the northwest of Caribou Island when the ship "unknowingly swept the reef" during this Whitefish Lights Point and radio flares are not available as navigational aids. This theory is supported by the Canadian hydrographic survey of 1976, which reveals that an unknown herd runs a mile further east than Six Fathom Shoal than is shown on a Canadian map. Officers from Anderson observed that Fitzgerald sailed past this exact area. Allegations by proponents of Six Fathom Shoal's theory conclude that McGorley's fitzgerald fossil railway reportedly occurs only if the ship "stalls" during shoaling, with bow and stern bending down and the center is lifted by a flock, pulling a tight fence until the cable is dislodged or tearing under pressure. Divers searched for Six Fathom Shoal after the accident occurred and found no evidence of a "new collision or runway anywhere." Maritime writers, Bishop and Stonehouse wrote that the shoaling theory was then challenged on the basis of a higher quality detail in Shannon's 1994 photography that "explicitly demonstrates [destruction] Fitzgerald." Shannon's photography of Fitzgerald ' s invertedly denotes "there is no evidence under the stern, the propeller or the steering wheel that will show the ship crashing into a herd."
The maritime writer Stonehouse reasoned that "unlike Lake Carriers, Coast Guardians have no interest in the results of their investigations." Bishop's author reports that Captain Paquette of Wilfred Sykes argued that through their support for shoaling explanations, LCA represents the interests of shipping companies by advocating the theories held by LCA member companies, the American Transportation Bureau and the innocent US Coast Guard Office.
Paul Hainault, a retired engineering professor of mechanics from Michigan Technological University, promoted the theory that began as a student class project. The hypothesis states that Fitzgerald is grounded at 9:30 am on November 10th at Superior Shoal. This Shoal, charted in 1929, is an underwater mountain in the middle of Lake Superior about 50 miles (80 km) north of Copper Harbor, Michigan. It has a sharp peak that rises almost to the surface of the lake with water depths ranging from 22 to 400 feet (6.7 to 121.9 m), making it a threat to navigation. The shoal discovery generates changes in the recommended cruise route. Seiche, or standing wave, which occurred during the low-pressure system over Lake Superior on November 10, 1975, caused the lake to rise 3 feet (0.91 m) above the Soo Locks gate to flood Portage Avenue in Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, with 1 foot (0.3 m) water. The Hainault theory states that this seiche contributes to the Fitzgerald shoaling 200 feet (61 m) from its stomach in Superior Shoal, causing the stomach to be pierced in the middle of the body. The hypothesis states that wave action continues to damage the stomach, until the middle third breaks like a box, leaving the ship united by the central deck. The stern section acts as an anchor and causes Fitzgerald to stop completely, causing it to go forward. Ships broke out on the surface in a matter of seconds. The compressed air pressure blew a hole in the right arc, which sank 18 degrees of course. The back continues to advance with the engine still running, rolling over to the port and landing at the bottom.
The theory of structural failure
Another published theory suggests that weakened structures, and modifications to Fitzgerald ' winter load loading (which allows heavier loading and lower travel in water), allow for large waves causes stress fractures in the stomach. It is based on the "usual" storm surge and does not always involve wicked waves.
USCG and NTSB investigated whether Fitzgerald was ruptured due to structural failure of the stomach and because of the 1976 CURVÃ, III survey found the Fitzgerald section was 170 feet (52 m) of each addition, the report the official USCG victim in July 1977 concluded that he had parted when reaching the bottom of the lake. NTSB comes to the same conclusion as USCG because:
The proximity of the bow and stern at the base of Lake Superior shows that the ship sank in a state of intact and broke either when crashing into the bottom or down. Therefore, Fitzgerald did not experience major structural failures on the stomach while on the surface... The last position of the ruins indicates that if Fitzgerald has been reversed, it must have structural failure before crashing bottom of the lake. The bow section should be self-contained and the stern should be inverted before stopping at the bottom. Therefore, it is concluded that Fitzgerald is not reversed on the surface.
Other authors conclude that Fitzgerald is likely to split into two on the surface before sinking due to strong waves, such as Carl D. Bradley ore carriers and Daniel J. Morrell i>. After maritime historian Frederick Stonehouse moderated the panel reviewing the video footage of the ROV survey of 1986 on Fitzgerald, he concluded that the level of taconite coverage on the shipwreck site showed that the stern had floated on the surface for a short time and spilled the taconite the front; so two parts of the wreck did not sink at the same time. Shannon's 1994 team found that the stern and the bow were 255 feet (78 m) besides leading Shannon to conclude that Fitzgerald was broken on the surface. He says:
This placement does not support the theory that the ship fell to the bottom in one section, breaking when crashing into the bottom. If this is true, the two parts will be closer. In addition, the corners, rest and mounds of clay and mud at the site indicate the stern is rolled over the surface, spilling taconite ore grains from a disconnected cargo load, and then landing on the cargo parts themselves.
The stress fracture theory is supported by the testimony of former crew members. Former Second Mate Richard Orgel, who served at Fitzgerald in 1972 and 1973, testified that "the ship has a tendency to bend and appear during a storm" like a skateboard after a person jumps. ' "Orgel was quoted as saying that the loss of Fitzgerald was caused by stomach failure," pure and simple. I detect undue pressure on the side of the tunnel by checking the white enamel paint, which will crack and flake when delivered to severe stress. "George H." Red "Burgner,
When Bethlehem Steel Corporation permanently laid the Aritz B. Homer's sister ship, Arthur B. Homer, just five years after going to a considerable cost to extend him, the question was asked whether the two vessels had the same structural problems. Both vessels are built in the same shipyard using a welded joint instead of a fixed connection used in an older ore carrier vessel. Connection connections allow the ship to flex and work in heavy seas, while the welded joints are more likely to break. The report indicates that the fix for Fitzgerald ' s hull was postponed in 1975 due to plans to extend the vessel for the upcoming winter. Homer was extended to 825 feet (251 m) and placed back in December 1975, shortly after Fitzgerald foundered. In 1978, without explanation, Bethlehem Steel Corporation refused permission for NTSB chairman to travel in Homer. Homer was permanently placed in 1980 and damaged by scrap in 1987.
Retired GLEW navy architect Raymond Ramsay, one of the design team members working on Fitzgerald's hull, reviewed his growing line of cargo, maintenance history, along with a long history of hull failure and ending that Fitzgerald did not take effect on November 10, 1975. He stated that Fitzgerald's planning was compatible with the obstacles of St. Lawrence Seaway has placed his stomach design in a "straight jacket." Fitzgerald ' The long ship design was developed without the benefit of the principle of research, development , testing, and evaluation while computerized analytical technology was not available when it was built. Ramsay notes that Fitzgerald's hull is built with the all-welded modular (not rigid) modular fabrication method, which was used for the first time at the GLEW shipyard. Ramsay concluded that an increase in stomach length up to 729 feet (222 m) resulted in a L/D slim ratio (the ratio of ship length to depth of structure) causing excessive multi-axial bending and hull surges, and that the stomach should be structurally reinforced to overcome its length increases.
Topside damage theory
The USCG mentions topside damage as a reasonable alternative reason for the drowning Fitzgerald and suspects that damage to rail fences and ventilation may be caused by heavy floating objects such as logs. Historian and sailor Mark Thompson believes that something is off the Fitzgerald Deck '. He theorized that the disappearance of the vents resulted in flooding of two return tanks or reply tanks and tunnels running causing the ship to enter the list. Thompson further suspected that the wider damage than Captain McSorley could detect in the steering room let water flood the cargo. He concluded that Fitzgerald's topside damage occurred at 3:30 am. on November 10, aggravated by the heavy sea, is the clearest explanation of why he drowned.
Possible contributing factors
The USCG, NTSB, and supporters of alternative theories are all named after several factors contributing to the establishment of Fitzgerald.
Weather forecast
The NWS long-term forecast on November 9, 1975, predicted that the storm would pass right south of Lake Superior and over the Keweenaw Peninsula, stretching to the Lake of the Upper Peninsula in Michigan. Captain Paquette of Wilfred Sykes has followed and charted a low-pressure system on Oklahoma since Nov. 8 and concluded that a major storm will trace east of Lake Superior. So he chose the route that gave Sykes the most protection and shelter in Thunder Bay, Ontario, during the worst storm. Based on NWS estimates, Arthur M. Anderson and Edmund Fitzgerald began their journey across Lake Superior following the usual Route Lake Router route, which placed them in the path of the storm. The NTSB investigation concluded that NWS failed to accurately predict wave heights by 10 November. After running a computer model in 2005 using actual meteorological data from November 10, 1975, Hultquist of NWS said about Fitzgerald 'Position in a storm, "It ended in the wrong place at the worst of times. "
After reviewing the testimony that Fitzgerald had passed near the northern shelf of Caribou Island, the USCG Marine Board checked the relevant navigation charts. They found that the 1973 Canadian navigation map for the Six Fathom Shoal area was based on a Canadian survey of 1916 and 1919 and that the 1973 US Lake Survey Survey. 9 including the notation, "Canadian Territory For data on Canadian territory, Canada, authorities have been consulted." Subsequently, at the request of the Ninth Board of Marine and District Commander Nine USCG, the Canadian Hydrographic Service conducted a survey of the area around Michipicoten Island and Caribou Island on in 1976. The survey revealed that the shelf ran about 1 mile (1.6 km) further east than the one shown on the Canadian chart. The NTSB investigation concluded that, at the time of the Fitzgerald occupation, Lake Survey Chart no. 9 is not detailed enough to show Six Fathom Shoal as a navigation hazard.
Disadvantages of waterproof bulkheads
Mark Thompson, a seafarer and writer of many books on Great Lakes shipping, stated that if his cargo had a watertight subdivision, "the Fitzgerald could make it into Whitefish Bay." Frederick Stonehouse also argues that the lack of watertight bulkheads causes Fitzgerald to drown. He says:
Great Lakes ore carriers are the most commercially efficient vessels in today's shipping trade. But that's just a motorized barge! This is an unsafe commercial vessel that floats. It has almost no watertight integrity. Theoretically, an inch of puncture in the cargo room would drown it.
Stonehouse asked ship designers and builders to design aircraft carriers more like boats than "super-motorized boats" that make the following comparisons:
Contrast this to Fitzgerald with the story of SS Maumee, an oceangoing tanker that hit an iceberg near the South Pole recently. The collision tore a hole in the bow of a ship large enough to drive a truck, but Maumee could travel across the globe to the repair page, without difficulty, as he was equipped with waterproof bulkheads..
After Fitzgerald ran aground, the Great Lakes shipping companies were accused of assessing cargo loads more than human life, as cargo shiploads of 860,950 cubic feet (24,379 m 3 ) had been split with two bulkheads "screens" that are not water-resistant. The NTSB investigation of Fitzgerald concluded that the Great Lake transport vessels had to be built with a watertight bulkhead in their cargo.
The USCG has proposed rules for waterproof bulkheads on the Great Lakes ship as early as the sinking of Daniel J. Morrell in 1966 and did it again after the sinking of Fitzgerald, arguing that this would allow ships to take cover or at least allow crew members to leave the ship regularly. LCA represents the owner of the Great Lakes fleet and is able to prevent sub-regulatory impermeable regulations by stating that this will cause economic hardship for the ship operator. Some ship operators have built Great Lakes vessels with waterproof subdivisions in cargo since 1975, but most of the vessels operating on the lake can not prevent flooding in all cargo storage areas.
Lack of instrumentation
Fathometer is not required under USCG regulations, and Fitzgerald lacks one, even though fathometers are available by the time it sinks. On the contrary, the hand line is the only method Fitzgerald should take a deep voice. The hand line consists of a piece of line tied at a measured interval with a lead weight at the end. The line was thrown over the bow of the ship and the count of knots measured the depth of water. The NTSB investigation concluded that the fathometer would provide Fitzgerald additional navigational data and make it less dependent on Anderson for navigation assistance.
Fitzgerald has no system to monitor the presence or amount of water in the cargo space, although there are always some prizes. The intensity of the November 10 storm will make it difficult, if not impossible, to access the hold of the spar (the deck above the cargo hold). The USCG Marine Board finds that flooded hatches can not be assessed until the water reaches the top of the taconite cargo. The NTSB investigation concluded that it was impossible to pump water from the hold when filled with bulk cargo. The Marine Board notes that because Fitzgerald does not have a draft reading system, the crew has no way of determining whether the ship has lost its freeboard (boat deck level above water).
Increased load line, freeboard reduction
The USCG increased Fitzgerald's load line in 1969, 1971, and 1973 to allow a minimum freeboard of 3 feet 3.25 inches (997 mm) from Fitzgerald i> 'Original design allowed in 1958. This means that the Fitzgerald ' deck is only 11.5 feet (3.5 m) across over water when he faces a 35 foot (11 m) wave during a November 10 storm. Captain Paquette of Sykes notes that this change allows loading up to 4,000 tons more than what
Concerns about the Fitzgerald welding problem ' appear during the time USCG starts to increase its loading line. This increase and the resulting reduction in the freeboard lower the absorption of the vessel's reserves. Before load-line increased, he was said to be a "good riding boat" but after that Fitzgerald became a sluggish ship with a slower response and recovery time. Captain McSorley said he did not like the action of the ship he described as a "swaying object" that frightened him. Fitzgerald ' s arc connected to one side or another in the heavy sea without recovering and making the sound of a groan not heard on other vessels.
Maintenance
The NTSB researchers noted that previous Fitzgerald ' could cause undetected damage that caused major structural failure during a storm, since the Great Lakes vessel is usually dried for inspection only once every five years. It was also suspected that when compared to the previous captain's Fitzgerald ', McSorley did not follow routine maintenance and did not confront the couple about getting the required job. After August B. Herbel, Jr., president of the American Society for Testing and Materials, examined welded photographs at Fitzgerald he declared, "The keel has just been held together with the plate patch." Another question that arises is why the USCG did not discover and take corrective action in its pre-November 1975 examination of Fitzgerald considering that its hatch reels, gaskets, and clamps were not properly maintained.
Complacency
On the ill-fated night of November 10, 1975, McSorley reported that he had never seen a larger ocean in his life. Paquette, master of Wilfred Sykes, came out in the same storm, saying, "I'll tell anyone that it's a monster ocean washing solid water on the deck of every ship outside there." USCG does not broadcast that all ships should look for safe anchors until after 3:35 am. on November 10, a few hours after the weather was upgraded from storm to storm.
McSorley is known as the "heavy weather captain" who "defeats hell" out of Fitzgerald and 'very rarely ever been transported to weather ' ". Paquette argues that the omission led to Fitzgerald being founder. He said, "In my opinion, all subsequent events arise because (McSorley) continues to push the ship and do not have enough training in weather forecasts to use common sense and choose the worst out of the wind and sea route." The Paquette ship was the first to reach the port of exile after the November 10 th storm; he was met by a company lawyer who came aboard Sykes. He told them that Fitzgerald ' was caused by negligence. Paquette was never asked to testify during a USCG or NTSB investigation.
The NTSB investigation noted that the Great Lakes cargo ship typically could avoid severe storms, and called for the establishment of a limiting marine state applicable to Great Lake bulk cargo ships. This will limit the operation of ships at sea above the limiting value. One concern is that shipping companies are pressing captains to deliver cargo as quickly and cheaply as possible regardless of bad weather. At the time of the Fitzgerald , there was no evidence that any government regulatory body tried to control the movement of ships in bad weather despite historical records that hundreds of Great Lakes ships had been destroyed in the storm. USCG takes a position that can only be decided by the captain when it is safe to sail.
The USCG Marine Board issued the following conclusions:
The nature of Great Lakes shipping, with shorter shipping, most of the time in highly protected waters, often with the same routine of travel to travel, leads to overly optimistic satisfaction and attitude about extreme weather conditions that can and do exist. The Maritime Council feels that this attitude reflects itself sometimes in the postponement of maintenance and repair, for failing to properly prepare for bad weather, and in the belief that because the shelter is near, salvation is possible by "running for it." While it is true that conditions are sailing well during the summer, the changes can occur suddenly, with severe storms and extreme weather and rapidly emerging marine conditions. This tragic accident shows the need for everyone involved in the Great Lakes shipment to raise awareness of the dangers.
Mark Thompson denied that the "Coast Guard puts his own satisfaction" by blaming the sinking of Fitzgerald on satisfaction across the industry for having examined Fitzgerald just two weeks earlier. he drowned. The loss of Fitzgerald also exposes the lack of USCG rescue capabilities in Lake Superior. Thompson said that ongoing budget cuts have limited the ability of USCG to perform its historical function. He further noted that the USCG rescue boat was unlikely to reach the scene on Lake Superior or Lake Huron within 6 to 12 hours of the incident.
Legal assignment
Under maritime law, ships fall under the jurisdiction of the maritime court of their flag state. Like Fitzgerald is sailing under the US flag, even though he is drowning in foreign waters (Canada), he is subject to US admiralty laws. At $ 24 million, Fitzgerald's ' financial loss was the largest in the history of the Great Lakes sail. In addition to the crew, 26,116 tonnes long (29,250 ton short; 26,535 t) taconite sank along with the ship. Two widows of the crew filed a $ 1.5 million lawsuit against Northwestern Mutual owner Fitzgerald , , and his operator, Oglebay Norton Corporation, a week after he sank. Additional demands of $ 2.1 million were then filed. Oglebay Norton then petitioned in US District Court attempting to "limit their liability to $ 817,920 in respect of other clothing filed by the family of crew members." The Company paid compensation to the surviving family about 12 months before the official findings of possible causes and with the terms of the imposed confidentiality agreement. Robert Hemming, a newspaper reporter and editor, reasoned in his book on Fitzgerald that USCG's conclusions were "harmless in putting an error on [n] either the company or the captain... [and] saving Oglebay Norton from the demands a very expensive law by the families of missing crew. "
Next change for Great Lakes shipping practice
The USCG investigation of the sinking of Fitzgerald produced 15 recommendations on load pathways, integrity intensity, search and rescue capabilities, lifesaving equipment, crew training, manual loading, and information to the Great Lakes ship masters. The NTSB investigation produced 19 recommendations for USCG, four recommendations for the American Delivery Bureau, and two recommendations for NOAA. From official recommendations, the following actions and USCG regulations apply:
- 1. In 1977, the USCG made a requirement that all ships of 1600 gross tons register and more than use depth seekers.
- 2. Since 1980, survival clothing is needed on board in each crew member and at their customary work station with strobe lights attached to life jackets and rescue suits.
- 3. The LORAN-C positioning system for navigation on the Great Lakes was carried out in 1980 and subsequently replaced with Global Positioning System (GPS) in the 1990s.
- 4. Emergency Positions Shows Radio Beacons (EPIRBs) installed on all Great Lakes ships for fast and accurate locations in case of disaster.
- 5. The navigation charts for Lake Superior northeast are enhanced for greater accuracy and detail.
- 6. NOAA revises its method to predict wave heights.
- 7. USCG cancels the change of the 1973 Load Line Rule allowing for reduced freeboard load.
- 8. The USCG commences the annual pre-November examination program recommended by NTSB. "Coast Guard supervisors are now boarding all US ships during the fall to check hatch covers and ventilation holes and lifesaving equipment."
Karl Bohnak, a meteorologist on the Upper Peninsula, covered his sink and storm in a book on local weather history. In this book, Joe Warren, a thrower at Anderson during November 10, 1975, a storm, said that the storm changed the way things were done. He stated, "After that, trust me, when the storm comes, we drop the hook [anchor] We drop the hook because they find the big one can drown." Mark Thompson writes, "Due to Fitz's loss, some captains may be more likely to go to anchor, than to explore in severe storms, but many still want to describe themselves as 'heavy weather sailors'. "
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